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The paper analyses the differences in venture capital (VC) firms, proposes a classification of the firms and 
empirically investigates their investment and co-investment behaviour. The VC firms are not homogeneous and 
beside funds they possess a diverse set of nonfinancial resources which they optimize. A classification is 
developed based on VC firm resources and specialization represented by organizational form and affiliation. 
Based on Australian market data, we classify the VC firms in three categories, namely strategic, financial and 
independent using resource based theory, and highlight differences. Then the firms’ specialization is related to 
their portfolio characteristics to identify and analyse differences and complementarities in terms of investment 
strategies. The influence of specialization in investment and co-investment strategies is also analysed. This study 
shows that specialization influences investment decisions and co-investor selection. Implications of such 
investment practices on resource efficiency, financial viability and transition to sustainability are also discussed.  
Keywords: venture capital, firm resources, specialization, co-investment syndication, industry sustainability 
JEL Classification: G24, L14, L21, M14, O56 
1. Introduction 
In the last few decades venture capital (VC) backed enterprises have brought many innovative products and 
processes to the market. This has helped many start-up and expanding companies in situations when bank debt 
had not been available to them. Success stories such as Apple, Google, Cisco, FedEx, YouTube and Facebook 
raised the profile of the VC industry across the world. Venture capital has eventually attracted various individual 
and institutional investors such as high net worth individuals, family funds, corporations, private and public 
pension funds, university endowment funds, government funds as well as banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. Investors from various backgrounds come with different investment objectives, preferences, risk 
profile, time horizon and strategic orientation. Venture capital fund managers also known as venture capitalists 
(VCs) who run the venture capital firms (VCFs) would usually raise funding from different clusters of 
compatible investors to invest and manage the funds for a fee and carried interest under agreed conditions 
(Sahlman, 1990; Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Wong 2006). Different investors and funds with different investment 
focus contribute to the various layers of the entrepreneurial development in the national and globalized economy. 
It would thus be logical to expect that VC fund managers organize and invest funds in areas where they have 
expertise and competitive advantage. For example, investing in enterprises at their early stage comes with a 
significant risk. The VCs would require relevant industry expertise to assess and manage the investment risk. 
Similarly, investment in the later stages would require larger fund availability as equity prices would be higher 
for more mature ventures. Thus, the VC investment focus in terms of venture stage as well as sector and location 
would be consistent with VCFs’ resources. Furthermore, investment in and management of many ventures may 
require expertise and resources which could be provided better by more than one VCF. Therefore, VCFs would 
not only select portfolios according to the firm resources but also seek co-investment partners for the 
complementary resources necessary for the portfolio selection and growth. Co-investment in ventures connects 
VCFs in tangible networks which could facilities the flow of information and resources across the industry. In 
this paper we develop a classification of VCFs according to their specialization and empirically investigate 
specialization-based investment and co-investment strategies using Australian market data. Specialization-based 
investment strategies and related management practices have influenced the industry’s development, integration 
and continuity. The issue about the VC industry’s viability has come under close scrutiny especially since the 
2008 global financial crisis (GFC). This renewed the need for reviewing and reinforcing good industry practices. 
Hence, in this paper we also aim at understanding the best practices of the industry and its role in enterprise 




A resource-based approach to understanding the firm indicates that VCFs require two critical resources, namely 
financial and nonfinancial (Lockett & Wright, 2001). The firms may focus more on the financial position, 
industry expertise or both. Accordingly, we place the VCFs in three categories, namely financial, strategic and in 
dependent. Several hypotheses about the investment and co-investment syndication strategies of these three 
types of VCFs are tested using a dataset from Thomson Reuter which provides details on VCF profile, 
investment amount and dates, investee company stage and industry information in Australia (Venture Economics, 
2009).  Using probit models we test these hypotheses and validate the predictions. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of specialization based investment and syndication strategies of firms with reference to good 
industry practices and the Australian venture capital industry.   
2. Literature  
Identifying the fundamental difference among VCFs is central to understanding entrepreneurial finance 
(Hellmann, 2002; LiPuma, 2006). Nonetheless, the VC literature has provided very limited coverage of VCF 
diversity. Traditionally VC investment vehicles are formed as limited partnerships managed by a group of 
independent VCs who raise funds and manage the portfolio on behalf of the investors (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; 
Sahlman, 1990). Thus, VCFs involved in active fund raising have received attention from researchers as the 
mainstream firms for such activities (Hellmann, 2002). Progressively as the market expanded and matured, 
different types of investment vehicles started to emerge. Many individual corporations in particular entered the 
VC market with internal funds managed by hired fund managers on their behalf to invest in ventures of strategic 
importance (Winters & Murfin, 1988; Gompers & Lerner, 2000). These venture capitalists (also known as 
“captive venture capitalists”) are usually not pursuing fund raising and their strategic venture investment is 
viewed by many corporations as a substitute for internal research and development activities (Ernst et al., 2005).  
The VC literature gives a separate attention to corporate venture capital and entrepreneurship. Hellmann (2002) 
classified the VCFs as strategic and independent VC investors. The strategic VCs look to create synergies 
between the ventures and their core business. Hellmann (2002) considers corporate VC funds investing 
strategically in line with the sponsors’ core businesses as an example of strategic VCs. By contrast, he argues 
that independent VCs who raise and invest funds independently are motivated by the return on investment rather 
than any specific strategic outcome. These two types of VCs are in a position to organize and manage funds and 
portfolios using different strategies (Sykes & Block, 1989).  
Beside corporations, governments in many countries directly invest in VC funds to promote technological 
innovation and entrepreneurship (Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2001; Cumming, 2007). In Australia government 
funding programs and initiatives have also been supported by complimentary policy and regulatory reforms 
(Lerner & Watson, 2008). Public university endowment funds started to invest in VC usually to promote internal 
research and development outcomes (Wright, Lockett, Clarysse, & Binks, 2006). Banks and other financial 
intermediaries which do not usually lend to early stage enterprises as a part of their core business also started to 
form separate companies to invest in venture capital (Hellmann, Lindsey, & Puri, 2008). Institutional investors 
such as governments, universities, banks come up with different investment objectives and strategies as well as 
different structures of investment vehicles.  
There is limited interest in VCFs’ classification. Florida and Kenney (1988) identified three types of regional VC 
complexes in USA, namely the Silicon Valley’s technology oriented complex, New York’s finance-oriented 
complex and Boston’s hybrid complex. The study by Elango et al. (1995) describes four potential differences 
between VCFs, namely geographical location, firm size, stage preference and amount of assistance provided to 
the portfolio companies. The academic literature on VC either leaves other VC investment vehicles out of its 
analytical boundary or treats corporate VCs separately (Gompers & Lerner 2000). Guo and Jiang (2013) 
distinguish between local and foreign VCFs in China using organizational form with local firms organized as a 
limited liability partnership (LLP) and foreign ones as a limited liability company (LLC). Croce et al. (2015) 
distinguish between independent and bank affiliated VCFs and analyse their exposure to post investment 
leverage.  
However, in the market all investment vehicles are competing for the same set of entrepreneurial ventures. 
Therefore, it is worth understanding the behaviour of different VCFs as well as how they compete and 
collaborate with one another. Subsequently, all these types of investment vehicles should be taken into account 
and categorized in terms of their specialization Thus, the classification we put forward would be significantly 
different from the ones proposed by other authors such as Florida & Kenney (1988), Elgango et al., (1995), 
Hellmann (2002), Guo and Jiang (2013), Croce et al. (2015). We argue that every type of VCFs ultimately 
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pursues financial return while each might take different strategies. The strategic VCFs for example may 
prioritize final returns. Similarly, the size, geographical location, stage and industry focus of any venture investor 
could reveal the nature of VCF’s specialization.  
We classify all investment vehicles in three categories according to specialization in terms of firm resources 
using resource based theories. They argue that firms’ competitive advantage which could influence strategies is 
based on the tangible and intangible resources they possess (Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993). Some of the firm 
resources may be unique and difficult to imitate giving ongoing competitive advantage (Grant 1991; Barney, 
2001). Being a non-resource intensive service industry, we suppose that VCFs have two vital resources – funds 
(financial) and expertise (nonfinancial). The resource combination gives them competitive advantages which in 
turn influence their investment strategies. According to the venture capital literature, VCFs can syndicate 
investments to access the unique resources of other firms (Bygrave, 1987; Lockett and Wright, 2001; Tykvova, 
2007). However, there has not yet been an empirical analysis of the VCFs’ specialization in order to categorize 
their nature and activities. A specialization based classification of VCFs would allow us to investigate whether 
this influences firm behaviour not only in portfolio choice but also in partner section for investment syndication. 
3. Venture Capital Firm Classification   
Venture capital firms (VCFs) require funds which are provided by the investors and offer expertise for managing 
the funds. The expertise could be specific to a particular industry and/or location (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992). 
Thus we argue that all VCFs possess financial and nonfinancial resources in some combination which defines the 
nature of their specialization. We classify the firms in three categories, namely: Strategic, Independent and 
Financial VCFs. Unlike Hellman’s (2002) classification, strategic VCFs beside corporate VCFs include other 
similar special purpose firms. Similar to Hellmann’s (2002) classification we identify independent VCFs as those 
which raise funds. Financial VCFs are those sponsored by financial institutions such as banks and 
superannuation funds. From the Australian dataset the VCFs are identified on the basis of their organizational 
structure and financial affiliation taking into account that they are organized to maximize the access to resources 
(Pichler & Wilhelm, 2001; Berger et al., 2005).  
3.1 Strategic VCFs 
This category would include corporate sponsored VCFs as well as other special purpose VCFs such as public VC 
funds, university endowment funds investing in start-up and business incubator programs. They are usually not 
involved in fund raising activates. Funds are provided by the sponsor institutions. Hence, they are also known as 
captive VCFs. The purpose of investment could be limited in the sense that it would be strategically driven by 
the sponsoring organizations (Hellmann, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 2000). However these VCFs usually have 
specialized knowledge and relevant industry experience. Furthermore, their organizational resources and market 
accessibility could contribute to the value enhancement of the ventures at the point of exit. Their funds are 
usually not large and venture financing may be limited by the investing organization. Concurrently, the 
specialization would allow risks related to investment in start-ups which require more expert attention from the 
VCs (Sapienza, 1992). The strategic VCFs have competitive advantage in identifying investment opportunities 
quickly at an earlier stage before any competitors. Taking up a good quality venture earlier than the competitors 
has another advantage as the equity pricing would usually be lower at that stage requiring less investment funds. 
Thus, such VCFs tend to have relatively smaller funds under their management and they would specialize in 
nonfinancial resources such as expertise.  
3.2 Financial VCFs  
This category is similar to the strategic VCFs in the sense that they are not involved in fund raising. They are 
primarily affiliated with financial institutes which provide the funds. Although, the core business of banks and 
many non-bank financial institutes does not allow them to invest in high risk entrepreneurial ventures, they tend 
to form separate VCFs to invest in risky assets. Financial VCFs pursue pure financial return rather than any 
narrow strategic objective as the core business of the sponsoring institutions is maximizing financial return. 
Meanwhile, these VCFs tend to have relatively less venture specific experience. They usually fall short of 
industry specialization with little competitive advantage in early stages ventures. On the other hand, as affiliates 
of financial institutes the fund size they manage is usually large. Financial VCFs would hire professional fund 
managers often with financial market expertise and with strong capital market networks useful for ventures’ exit.  
Hence, they have competitive advantage in later stage venture investments with lower risk exposure. The 
investment horizon of financial institute affiliated VCFs is usually shorter which would be consistent with 
investment in later stage ventures. Nevertheless, financial VCFs could also hire managers with industry expertise 
and compete with independent VCFs in start-up investment market. In Australia from their early years, VCFs 
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affiliated with banks have played a dominant role in terms of market capitalization.  
3.3 Independent VCFs  
This category represents the VCFs which raise funds and manage the portfolio independently.  They could 
invest either in early and expansion stage ventures. The management team could specialize in one or more 
industries and/or geographic locations. They raise funds from a set of retail or institutional investors with similar 
risk profiles and investment focus. The portfolio construction would be consistent with the management 
expertise they possess. The expertise and experience of the VCs could be instrumental in identifying 
opportunities before the competitors and adding value to the portfolio. The fund size and investment horizon 
should be in line with the investment objectives. Hence, independent venture capitalists have financial and 
nonfinancial resources in a relatively balanced proportion. Like strategic VCFs they could have venture specific 
expertise to seize opportunities in early stage ventures and like financial VCFs they could have flexibility to raise 
larger funds and invest in expansion stages.  
4. Theories and Hypotheses   
We defined the VCFs’ specialization and competitive advantage in terms of their financial and nonfinancial 
resources in line with the resource based theories of firms (Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993; Barney, 2001). In the 
VC industry the critical firm resources are financial and nonfinancial which together influence the stage or 
industry specific portfolio construction (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992). Managerial attributes and the market network 
of the fund managers could be a source of diverse investment strategies adopted by different VCFs (Gort et al., 
1985). Therefore, VCFs choose investment strategies to take advantage of the firms’ tangible and intangible 
resources. Their risk profile and specializations could be reflected in the organizational structure, corporate 
affiliation as well as in portfolio construction (Guo & Jiang, 2013; Berger et al., 2005; Norton & Tenenbaum, 
1993). Hence, for empirical purposes we use the organizational affiliation and portfolio characteristics of the 
VCFs to identify specialization and related strategies.  
In the early stage the ventures might require more attention and nonfinancial resources from the venture 
capitalists (Sapienza, 1992). Strategic VCFs are likely to have industry specific expertise and advantage in 
identifying investment opportunities in the early stage. Early stage private equities are relatively cheaper as the 
investment risk is higher. Hence, the VCFs investing predominantly in early stages in any industries would 
manage relatively smaller funds. The stage focus may sometimes be explicitly revealed in firms’ portfolio 
whereas many VCFs declare their investment focus. We expect that strategic VCFs would focus primarily on 
early stage ventures.  On the other hand, VCFs affiliated with financial institutes are likely to have greater 
access to funds from the sponsors.  Since the objective of the financial institutes is maximizing returns on 
investment, the affiliated VCFs would entirely focus on pure financial return, rather than any narrow strategic 
objective. Lack of specialization could limit their ability of screening ventures at the early stage. Compared to 
seed stage, expansion stage investments come with a lower risk, although with a higher equity price. Such 
options could be suitable for these VCFs given their greater access to funds, shorter investment horizon and 
limited venture specific expertise. Thus, we predict that they would focus more on expansion stage rather than 
early stage ventures. The first two hypotheses to be empirically tested are: 
H1: Investors in seed/ early stage ventures are likely to be the strategic VCFs. 
H2: Investors in expansion stage ventures are likely to be the financial VCFs. 
In terms of investment screening and management, an individual VCF could require complementary resources 
from other firms which could lead to co-investment or syndication. Pfeffer & Salancik (2003) argue that 
organizations are limited by their resources and therefore subject to interdependence. Das & Teng (2003) used 
the resource based view to explain strategic alliances between firms. In essence sharing information and getting 
access to the specialized knowledge of other VCFs are seen as the key driver in syndication (Bygrave, 1987; 
Manigart et.al., 2006). We expect that strategic VCFs because of their greater venture specific expertise and 
limited funds could seek collaboration with independent or financial VCFs. Consequently, a strategic VCF is 
more unlikely to co-invest with another strategic VCF. Financial VCFs on the other hand are less likely to invite 
similar VCFs to syndicate as they are likely to seek industry specific expertise in the potential partners. 
Nonetheless, it should be distinguished from later stage private equity investments where financial VCFs could 
be active in both equity and debt syndication. The second two hypotheses to be empirically tested are: 
H3: Strategic VCFs are more unlikely to invite a similar VCF to syndicate.  
H4: Financial VCFs are more unlikely to invite a similar VCF to syndicate. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
To empirically test the above four hypotheses, we analyse venture capital investments in Australian companies 
by Australian VCs between 1984 and 2008. This covers the first 25 years of the life of the Australian VC industry. 
More specifically the observation includes 1157 investment rounds in 364 companies financed by 126 VCFs. 
Investments in early stage and expanding technology related companies have been considered as VC investment. 
The information for the empirical investigation has been extracted from the VentureXpert database (Venture 
Economics, 2009) which is fairly comprehensive and widely used by academics and practitioners (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004). The dataset provides a venture industry classification and information about the VCF profile 
including investor affiliation which is useful for our purpose. Corporate affiliate VCFs, incubators, university 
and government venture funds are classified as strategic VCFs while VCFs directly affiliated with banks and 
nonbank financial institute are classified as financial VCFs. Within the dataset the independent VCFs are defined 
as those raising and investing own funds. Table 1 presents the classification and characteristics of the VCFs in 
the sample.  
 
Table 1. Classification of VCFs 
Category   Examples Funds Investment  Other characteristics  Number 
in sample 
Financial Bank group, affiliate/subsidiary of 
financial institution, insurance firm 
affiliate/subsidiary, 
investment/merchant bank investing 
own/client funds, commercial bank 
affiliate/subsidiary, investment 
management firm/finance consultancy, 
investment/ angel network, private 
equity advisor/ fund of fund manager 




• Pursue pure 
financial return 





advantage in later 
stage investments 
• Not involved in 
fund raising 




• Shorter investment 
horizon 
46 
Independent Private equity firms investing own 
capital 
• Raise funds 

















Strategic  Government programs, university 
affiliated programs, incubators, 
corporate subsidiary/affiliate, corporate 
venture program, business 
development fund 


















     126 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The Australian VC industry represents particular features in relation to different types VCFs (see Table 2). 
Independent VCFs raising and investing own funds are the most active category in terms of investment activity; 
66.3% of the total ventures in the dataset received investment at least from one independent VCF. Financial 
VCFs are the second most active category which have invested in 45% companies. In terms of total share in 
investment activities strategic VCFs have been narrowly and selectively active in line with their strategic focus 
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Table 2. Different VCFs’ preference over venture stage 
Type of VCFs Seed & Early Stage Expansion Stage Total Ventures 
Financial 31 33.70% 61 66.30% 92 25.27% 
Independent  102 52.31% 93 47.69% 195 53.57% 
Strategic  65 84.42% 12 15.58% 77 21.16% 
All 198 54.40% 166 45.60% 364 100% 
 
Table 3 shows the size distribution of different VCFs in terms of capital under management. We observe that 
financial VCFs manage the largest funds followed by independent VCFs which is consistent with our 
expectations. It can also be observed that the strategic investors manage relatively small funds. Their expertise 
and specialization arguably compensate for the fund size. Interestingly, the minimum fund size for all types is 
similar which could be considered to be the critical fund size. 
 
Table 3. Different VCFs’ size distribution  
Type of VCFs Maximum (U$ million) Minimum (U$ million) Mean Size (SD) 
Financial  1952.9 0.5 341.8 (567.1) 
Independent   476.6 0.6 121.3 (116.2) 
Strategic  151.8 0.6 23.1 (39.2) 
 
In terms of portfolio companies, we follow the industry classification of the dataset and we have considered two 
broad classes of technology related industries. They are: BMH (biotechnology, medical and health) industry and 
ICT (information and telecommunication technology) industry. Other ventures not related to technology have 
been excluded from the analytical boundary as VC traditionally and for most users refers to investment in 
innovative and technology related ventures especially in the early and expansion stage (Chesbrough, 2002). The 
data along with industry classification also provide information on investment date, amount and venture stage 
which allows us to identify and record the syndication activates of VCFs.  
 
Table 4. Industry preference of different VCFs  
Industry Financial Independent   Strategic 
BMH (N=123) 39.13% 28.72% 40.26% 
ICT (N=241) 60.87% 71.28% 59.74% 
 
The VCFs have invested strongly in the ICT sector (241 ventures compared to 123 in BMH, see Table 4). There 
are however significant numbers of VCFs which invest in both ICT and BMH sectors. Further, all types of VCFs 
are involved in syndication as shown in Table 5. The strategic VCFs are the least active in seeking co-investors. 
It can be explained by the fact that they invest more often in early stages given their expertise and as the ventures 
mature obtaining debt could become easier and preferable. The financial VCFs demonstrate higher degree of 
syndication which could be explained by the nature of specialization as well as risk diversification strategies. 
Despite this, there is only a small difference between them and independent VCFs. 
 
Table 5. Degree of syndication by different VCFs 
Type of VCFs  Propensity to Syndicate (%) 
Financial (N=92) 23.91 
Independent (N=195) 23.59 
Strategic (N=77) 19.48 
 
5.2 Regression Model  
We use the investment and co-investment/ syndications activities of each VCF type observed in the dataset for 
testing the hypotheses. Simple discrete (binary) choice econometric models are used without losing the insight 
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and generality of the predictions. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) suggest that empirically there is insignificant 
difference between the predicted probabilities generated by probit and logit models. We apply probit models for 
the empirical investigation of each of the four hypotheses with model 1 and 2 corresponding to hypothesis 1 and 
2 and model 3 and 4 to hypothesis 3 and 4.  
5.2.1 Model 1 and 2 
Model 1 and 2 have been structured as probit models in order to validate hypothesis 1 and 2. The ‘Type of VCFs’ 
is considered as the dependent variable. In both models, the stage of investee companies is considered as the 
independent variable representing the risk profile of the investors. Investments in start-up and early stage 
ventures are likely to be made by the strategic investors. In other words, the probability that a VCF is strategic 
would be higher if an investment round occurs at the seed/start-up and early stage. More specifically, in models 1, 
the dependent variable “Type of VCF (Strategic)’ is binary. Its value is considered 1, if one or more investors are 
strategic VCFs and 0 if not. Similarly, we consider ‘Company stage’ as 1 if the first VC investment round is 
made in early stages (seed/start-up) and 0 if not. The coefficient is expected to be positive. The control variable 
is ‘Type of industry’ which is also binary. It is equal to 1 for BMH industry and 0 for ICT industry. Model 2 has 
the same structure as model 1. ‘Type of VCF (Financial)’ is the dependent variable. It is considered 1 when one 
or more investors are financial VCFs in the first VC investment round and 0 if not. Then, we consider ‘Company 
stage’ as 1 if the first VC investment round occurs during the expansion stage and 0 if not. The coefficient is 
expected to be positive. Again, the control variable is ‘Type of industry’ which is also binary. It is equal to 1 for 
BMH and 0 for ICT.  
5.2.2 Model 3 and 4 
Model 3 and 4 are also structured as probit models in order to validate hypothesis 3 and 4. The motivation of a 
certain VCF to invite another VCF to co-invest in a venture on the basis of their resource and specialization is 
being investigated here. We link the types of lead and follower VCFs using the dates of the investment rounds 
from the dataset. The probit model is constructed accordingly. The type of invited VCF (follower) in the 
syndicate is the independent variable whereas the type of inviting VCF (initiator) is the main dependent variable. 
It has been argued that the type of follower VCF in the syndicate is determined by the type of the lead VCF. 
However, in some cases there may be more than one lead and follower co-investors. In model 3, more 
specifically we consider the ‘Type of follower VCFs (strategic)’ as the dependent variable which is 1 when the 
VCF is strategic and 0 if not. Then, we consider the ‘Types of initiator VCF (strategic)’ as the independent 
variable which is essentially a lagged endogenous variable and thereby can be treated as exogenous. It implies 
that the type of initiator VCF is predetermined which will determine the types of follower VCF subsequently. 
The coefficient is expected to be negative. In other words, it is more unlikely for a strategic VCF to invite a 
similar investor to syndicate. In model 4, similarly we consider the ‘Type of follower VCFs (financial)’ as the 
dependent variable which is 1 when the VCF is financial and 0 if not. Thereafter, we consider the ‘Types of 
initiator VCF (financial)’ as the independent variable. The coefficient is again expected to be negative.  In both 
models, ‘Type of industry’ has been used as the control variable which is equal to 1 for BMH and 0 for ICT and 
it is not expected to have an impact on the selection of syndication partners.      
5.3 Regression Output 
The first two hypotheses relate the firms’ specialized resources with venture stage preference in investment 
decisions which have several implications. Early stage ventures come with higher risk but lower equity prices. 
Hence, venture capitalists with nonfinancial resource such as expertise and industry specific knowledge can 
explain the competitive advantage in identifying opportunities at the early stage. The risk appetites of the VCFs 
rather than financial position tend to be more important. The results from Model 1 (see Table 6) validate our 
prediction that strategic VCFs have higher likelihood of investing in companies during the early development 
stage. Similarly, the results from Model 2 (see Table 6) also validate our prediction that financial VCFs have 
higher likelihood of investing in companies during expansion. Financial VCFs as per our classification have 
affiliation with financial institutes and hence a strong financial position. These firms have lower risk appetite and 
a shorter investment horizon. They have competitive advantage in buying equities at a later stage when equity 
prices are higher but risk is lower. The investment patterns are similar in both ICT and BMH industries for the 
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Table 6. Probit model of venture stage selection by different VCFs  
Model 1. Dependent variable: Type of VCF (Strategic)  
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -1.2936 -10.74 
Company stage (Start-up/ Seed)  1.1298   7.01*** 
Type of  industry  0.0168   0.10 
Model 2. Dependent variable: Type of VCF (Financial) 
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -1.1482 -8.82 
Company stage (Expansion)  0.7235  4.82*** 
Type of industry  0.3157  2.03 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5% and ***Significant at 1%, Log likelihood Ratio for Model 1 is 53.10*** and for Model 2 is 
25.51***; Number of observations: 364 
 
The specific specialized resources of the VCFs not only can explain behaviour in relation to venture stage 
selection, but also in relation to co-investment partner selection. Co-investment is common in the VC industry 
which has implications in terms of financial and nonfinancial resource alignment as well as risk reduction and 
diversification. Given our categorization of VCFs, we expect that they would seek co-investors for 
complementary resources with impact on risk and return. Strategic VCFs are therefore less likely to co-invest 
with a similar VCF as they might have similar and competing instead of complementary resources. They usually 
specialize in identifying early investment opportunities.  Hence, they are likely to co-invest with independent 
and/or financial VCFs. The results from Model 3 (see Table 7) suggest that strategic VCFs are more unlikely to 
syndicate with similar investors to avoid duplication of resources and internal conflicts. The results from Model 
4 (see Table 7) similarly validate that financial VCFs are less likely to syndicate with similar investors.  
 
Table 7. Probit model of co-investor selection by different VCFs  
Model 3. Dependent variable: Type of Follower VCF (Strategic)  
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant  -0.8710 -2.41 
Type of lead VCF (strategic) -1.2480 -2.16** 
Industry 0.8312  1.91 
Model 4. Dependent variable: Type of Follower VCF (Financial)  
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant  -1.5345 -3.15 
Type of lead VCF (financial)  -0.7982 -1.72* 
Industry 1.4729  2.62 
*Significant at 10%** and Significant at 5%; Log likelihood Ratio for Model 3 is 9.15*** and for Model 4 is 10.21***; Number of 
observations: 52. 
 
Combining the regression results and data provides further insights. Strategic VCFs tend to syndicate less which 
could be explained by their strategic focus as well as industry expertise. While syndicating they tend to invite 
independent VCFs indicating further need for both financial and nonfinancial resources. The independent VCFs 
on the contrary tend to invite similar VCFs to co-invest indicating the need for combining resources necessary 
for venture screening, monitoring and development. Financial VCFs tend to invite independent VCFs as the 
latter could provide expertise needed for venture monitoring and growth. They could even invite similar VCFs 
for risk diversification at later stage investments. The empirical analysis shows a distinctively different 
behaviour by the three categories of VCFs which justifies the proposed new classification. It is also interesting to 
note that these specific features cut across the two very distinctive industry groups which confirms that the 
behaviour is related to the nature of the venture industry.  
6. Discussion  
Specialization based investment strategies have several sustainability implications which we analyse here as in 
the post-GFC financial world industry practitioners and policy makers have been seeking understanding and 
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instruments for enhancing the sustainability of the financial system with increasing focus on the risk and 
opportunities related to the environment, social and governance (ESG) matters (UNPRI, 2014; PwC & Waterman, 
2014; Nemetz, 2015). The literature on corporate sustainability has emphasized the growing role of ESG risks 
involved in investment decisions which has resulted in subsequent growth in sustainability accounting 
frameworks in recent years (Brown et al., 2009). However, such formal accounting has often been subject to the 
so-called greenwash and misapplication (Laufer, 2003; Furlow, 2010). Therefore, we suggest that existing good 
industry practices and culture such as specialization driven investment and co-investment practices can be the 
basis for integrating other emerging sustainability practices which could eventually influence firm behaviour 
(Gordon, 1991).  
Specialization based investment of the VCFs can be instrumental in optimizing the limited financial and 
nonfinancial resources in the Australian market by producing an efficient mix of resources at the firms’ portfolio 
level and by mobilizing its potential. This is especially important for the Australian VC market which has a 
shortage of long term risk capital necessary for start-up enterprises as well as VCs with relevant expertise and 
investment focus on technology start-up companies (AVCAL, 2012). Interdependence of the VCFs for resource 
exchange which drives syndication allows the VCFs to pool expertise and experience in venture selection and 
investment risk reduction as well as portfolio risk diversification (Hopp & Rieder, 2011; Hoppe & Lukas, 2014). 
Repeat co-investment and collaboration among the firms can take the VCs beyond arm-length transactions to a 
network of relationships which could help VCs accumulate social capital and build reputation (Kilduff & Brass, 
2010; Casamatta & Haritchabalet 2007). Gu & Lu (2014) consider reputation as an intangible organizational 
asset for VCFs which is represented by past performances. Reputed VCs are valuable and in demand for their 
expertise (Lerner, 1994, Tykvova, 2007; Gu & Lu, 2014). Social integration of the VCFs could help developing 
the industry culture which could influence firms’ behaviour and performance (Christensen & Gordon, 1999). It is 
not surprising that firm resources and inter-firm networks facilitating resource exchanges are attracting 
increasing attention with implications on innovation, entrepreneurship and marketing (Baraldi et al., 2012).  
From what we have observed in the Australian VC market, VCFs do not exhibit distinctively different behaviour 
in relation to two significantly diverse industries – ICT and BMH. It is unlikely that the VC industry will respond 
differently to any environmental or generally sustainability priorities, such as related to climate change, water 
resources or nature preservation. Sustainability imperatives are unlikely to be attractive and come into the VC 
mix if left to the market. The VC industry’s main priority is its financial viability.  Although VCs are 
increasingly giving attention to ESG issues in response to growing pressure from government and other 
stakeholder (PwC & Waterman, 2014; UNPRI, 2014), a culture based industry governance is needed to 
complement and strengthen the compliance based corporate governance. The industry culture could support 
standardization of good practices, such as responsible investment and ESG risk management among the firms.  
7. Conclusion 
The VC industry in Australia in the last three decades has attracted a large variety of individual and institutional 
investors resulting in different types of investment vehicles. However, the literature related to venture capital has 
often overlooked the diversity of investment vehicles and their role in the development of this industry. Using 
the resource based view of firms meeting the demand for entrepreneurial capital in Australia for ventures at 
different stages of development, the paper captured this diversity and demonstrates how three distinctive types of 
VCFs represent diverse clusters of investors and venture capitalists. The developed specialization based 
classification of VCFs, namely strategic, financial and independent, allows better understanding of the firms’ 
behaviour and market representation. According to the analysed empirical investigation, different kinds of 
investors with different risk profiles and investment preferences participated in the Australian VC market. They 
consequently used different investment vehicles to participate in the market and played specific and 
complementary roles in the development of the various market segments in its first 25 years of operation. 
Strategic VCFs brought in the expertise relevant for the ventures in the early stages and financial VCFs 
contributed further funding for expanding the ventures. This is clearly reflected in the firms’ investment 
strategies and portfolio section. The independent VCFs played a vital role in market development as they raised 
funds from various groups of investors and invested across the stages and industries. In addition, these 
mainstream VCFs gathered expertise and experience. Hence, the strategic and financial VCFs often invited 
independent VCFs to co-invest in ventures whereas the strategic and financial VCFs were less likely to invite 
similar counterparts to syndicate. This reflects the significance of complementary resources for the growth of 
portfolio companies. The paper not only demonstrates the interdependence of VCFs through co-investment 
activities but also highlights the lack of specific industry interest which potentially has implication for 
sustainability and environmental technologies that reduce carbon emission, decouple growth from the use of 
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energy and materials, to mention a few examples. The empirical analysis shows that VCFs are less responsive to 
industry differences. Any industry preference is primarily driven by market and financial returns where ICT and 
BMH sectors have largely been attracting venture capital, while sustainable technology ventures and social 
enterprises remain at the margin. Further studies are needed to explore how the VC industry could be integrated 
in a tangible social platform that could be used in encouraging and standardizing good industry practices with 
sustainability values.  
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